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Recent Developments 
Maryland v. Buie: FOURTII 
AMENDMENf AUlHORIZES 
W ARRANTLFSS PROTECTIVE SWEEP 
OF PREMISES WHEN OFFICER 
POSSESSES REASONABLE 
ARTICULABLE SUSPIOON TIIAT 
THE AREA POSES DANGER 
In Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 
(1990), the United States Supreme Court 
held that the fourth amendment permits 
a warrantless protective sweep in con-
junction with an in-home arrest if the 
searching officer possesses a reasonable 
belief based on specific and articulable 
facts that the area to be swept poses a 
danger to the officer or others. The Court 
found probable cause to be an unneces-
sarily strict standard in justifying protec-
tive sweeps. 
Two men committed an armed rob-
bery of a restaurant in Prince George's 
County, Maryland. One of the men was 
wearing a red running suit. That same 
day, police obtained arrest warrants for 
Jerome Edward Buie and his suspected 
accomplice in the robbery. In executing 
the arrest warrant for Buie at his home, 
police fanned out through the first and 
second floors, while one officer shouted 
into the basement, ordering anyone 
there to emerge. Eventually Buie ap-
peared at the bottom of the stairwell and 
was arrested. Police, thereafter, con-
ducted a protective sweep of the base-
ment and seized a red running suit which 
was found in plain view. 
sonable suspicion- should be sufficient 
to justify a limited additional intrusion 
to investigate the possibility of their pres-
ence." [d. at 1 095 (quoting Maryland v. 
Buie, 72 Md. App. 562, 576, 531 A.2d 
1290, 1297 (1988» (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
In reversing, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland recognized that when the in-
trusion is slight, as in a stop and frisk on 
a public street, it can be justified by a 
reasonable articulable suspicion. How-
ever, when the sanctity of the home is 
involved, the government must show 
that there was probable cause to believe 
a serious danger existed. The court of 
appeals held that the State had not satis-
fied this probable cause standard. [d. The 
Supreme Court then granted certiorari to 
determine the level of justification re-
quired by the fourth amendment before 
conducting a protective sweep. 
In arguing the legality of the protective 
sweep performed, the State of Maryland 
set forth two alternative theories: 1) pro-
tective sweeps should be permitted in all 
in-home arrests for violent crimes, under 
a reasonableness balancing test; or 2) 
protective sweeps should fall within the 
standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), requiring only a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that danger exists. 
Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1096. Conversely, Buie 
argued that a warrantless protective 
sweep should never be permitted, ex-
cept under exigent circumstances. Buie 
also contended that even if no warrant 
was reqUired, the probable cause stan-
dard should not be relaxed. Further-
more, even if this standard was relaxed, 
Buie contended that the State had not 
proven that a reasonable articulable sus-
picion existed. [d. 
involved outweighs the intrusion on the 
individual's fourth amendment interests. 
[d. The Court found such an exception 
to exist in Teny, where no search war-
rant or probable cause existed. The Terry 
Court held that an on-the-street frisk for 
weapons was authorized where the offi-
cer possessed a reasonable belief based 
on specific and articulable facts that the 
suspect was armed and dangerous. [d. In 
so holding, the Court reasoned that the 
invasion on the individual's fourth 
amendment rights was outweighed by 
the need for police officers to protect 
themselves and others from danger, even 
where officers may lack probable cause 
for an arrest. 
Similarly, the Court applied these same 
principles to roadside encounters in 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1097. There, the Court 
upheld the search of the passenger com-
partment of an automobile where an of-
ficer possessed a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the suspect was armed and 
dangerous. [d. Moreover, the Long Court 
"expressly rejected the contention that 
Terry restricted preventative searches to 
the person of a detained suspect." [d. 
Analogizing the instant case to Terry 
and Long, the Buie Court compared the 
risk of danger posed by persons hiding 
on the premises during an in-home arrest 
to that posed by,a suspect on the street 
or in a roadside encounter. It found the 
risk of danger during an in-home arrest as 
great as, if not greater than, an on-the-
street or roadside encounter for two rea-
sons: 1) a protective sweep, unlike a 
Terry or Long frisk, has already escalated 
to the point of arrest; and 2) unlike a 
street or roadside encounter, an in-home 
arrest places an officer at a disadvantage 
because he is on adversarial territory. [d. 
Since the same interests of Terry and 
Long existed in the instant case, the 
Court reasoned that the same standard 
should apply. 
Buie filed a pre-trial motion to suppress 
the running suit. Despite finding no prob-
able cause to search the basement, the 
court denied the motion, and the running 
suit was allowed into evidence. Buie was 
convicted of robbery with a deadly 
weapon and using a handgun in the com-
mission of a felony. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed. It deter-
mined that once police lawfully enter a 
home, their conduct should be governed 
by a standard of reasonableness. "[I]f 
there is reason to believe that the arrestee 
had accomplices who are still at large, 
something less than probable cause-rea-
Thus, the Court agreed with the State's 
argument that a warrant was not reqUired 
but cautioned that entering a room not 
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In an opinion delivered by Justice 
White, the Supreme Court first acknowl-
edged the general rule that a search is not 
reasonable absent a warrant issued on 
probable cause. [d. at 1096-97 (citing 
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 
462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983». Exceptions to 
this rule arise where the public interest 
searched prior to the arrest is not a de 
minimis intrusion that may be ignored. 
[d. at 1098. The Court held that incident 
to the arrest, an officer, without probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion, could 
search places immediately adjoining the 
area of arrest from which an attack could 
be launched. [d. Beyond that, however, 
"there must be articulable facts which, 
taken together with the rational infer-
ences from these facts, would warrant a 
reasonably prudent officer in believing 
that the area to be swept harbors an 
individual posing a danger ... " [d. 
In so holding, the Court emphasized 
the limited scope of a protective sweep; 
that is, it should be confined to a cursory 
visual inspection, not a full search, of 
areas where a person may be found. It 
may last as long as is necessary to relieve 
the suspicion of danger but no longer 
than is necessary for the arrest and depar-
ture. [d. at 1099. 
Moreover, the Court maintained that 
its holding did not conflict with Chimel 
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Buie, 
110 S. Ct. at 1099. The Chimel Court held 
that a warrantless but justifiable search 
incident to an in-home arrest was limited 
to the arrestee's person and the area from 
which he could obtain a weapon. The 
Court distinguished Chimel in two ways: 
1) it was concerned with preventing a 
full blown search of a house for evidence 
unrelated to the arrest, unlike the more 
limited intrusion of a protective sweep; 
and 2) the justification for the search was 
the threat posed by the arrestee, not by 
unseen third parties. [d. 
Relying on Terry and Long, the Su-
preme Court held that warrantless pro-
tective sweeps of private dwellings 
during an arrest are to be measured by a 
reasonable articulable suspicion stan-
dard. By relaxing the general rule requir-
ing probable cause, abuse of police 
discretion in determining the necessity 
and scope of a protective sweep may 
result. However, the Court has yet to 
recognize the validity of such speculative 
concerns. 
-Tena Touzos 
City of Annapolis v. United Food & 
Commercial Worker~ Local 400: 
DRUG TFSTING OF CITY POIlCE 
AND FIRE FIGIITERS WAS Nor AN 
UNCONS1mJfIONAL SFARCH AND 
SEIZURE WHEN CONDUCfED DUR-
ING A REGUlARLY-SCHEDULED 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 
In City of Annapolis v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers, Local 400, 317 
Md. 544, 565 A.2d 672 (1989), the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland held that the 
mandatory suspicionless drug testing of 
police and flfe fighters did not violate the 
fourth amendment. The court of appeals 
reasoned that the police and flfe fighters' 
privacy interests were outweighed by 
the City's compelling interest in the 
safety of personnel, co-workers, and the 
public. [d. at 566, 565 A.2d at 683. Thus, 
the court of appeals reversed the trial 
court's ruling. 
In September of 1986, the City of An-
napolis proposed to the unions a drug 
testing plan, which required police and 
fire fighters, as part of their regularly-
scheduled periodic physical examina-
tions, to submit urine samples to ascer-
tain the presence of illegal drugs. Id. at 
546, 565 A.2d at 672-73. One year later, 
after the parties failed to reach an agree-
ment regarding the details of the pro-
gram, the City flied a complaint of unfair 
labor practices with the State Mediation 
and Conciliation Service. [d. The City 
alleged in its complaint that the unions 
failed to negotiate in good faith. [d. The 
State Mediation and Conciliation Service 
found that the drug testing program was 
not unconstitutional as an unreasonable 
search and seizure and allowed the City 
to implement its program. The unions, 
seeking to prevent implementation of 
the program, appealed to the Circuit 
Court for Anne Arundel County. Id. at 
54748, 565 A.2d at 673-74. The circuit 
court found that the plan was unconsti-
tutional under the fourth amendment, 
because it was not based on individual-
ized suspicion of drug use among the 
employees. [d. at 549, 565 A.2d at 674. 
The lower court then issued a writ of 
mandamus enjoining the city from imple-
menting its program. [d. at 550, 565 A.2d 
at 675. The City appealed the circuit 
court's decision, and the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland granted certiorari prior 
to consideration by the court of special 
appeals. [d. 
In reaching its decision, the court of 
appeals relied primarily on two recent 
Supreme Court cases that were decided 
after the lower court's ruling. In the first 
case, National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 
(1989), the Court upheld mandatory sus-
picionless drug testing of Customs Serv-
ice employees involved in drug 
interdiction or who carried a firearm. 
United Food, 317 Md. at 551, 565 A.2d 
at 675. In the second case, Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. 
Ct. 1402 (1989), the Court approved Fed-
eral Railroad Administration regulations 
that mandated testing of blood and urine 
samples for drug use by employees fol-
lowing major train accidents. United 
Food, 317 Md. at 551,565 A.2d at 675. 
Both Skinner and Von Raab held that 
the collection and testing of urine was a 
"search" and implicated the proctection 
of the fourth amendment. Id. (citing 
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413; Von Raab, 
109 S. Ct. at 1390). However, in Skinner, 
the Supreme Court stated that "where 
the privacy interests implicated by the 
search are minimal, and where an impor-
tant governmental interest furthered by 
the intrusion would be placed in jeop-
ardy by a requirement of individualized 
suspicion, a search may be reasonable 
despite the absence of such suspicion." 
[d. at 552, 565 A.2d at 676 (quoting Skin-
ner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417). 
In applying the Supreme Court hold-
ings of Skinner and Von Raab to United 
Food, the court of appeals focused on the 
degree of intrusiveness of the "actual" 
assaying of the urine sample for drug use, 
instead of the mandatory taking of the 
sample. [d. at 553, 565 A.2d at 676. The 
court reasoned that the employees had 
already been providing samples for anal-
ysis as part of their regularly-scheduled 
physical examinations. [d. Recognizing 
that the actual assaying of samples for 
drug use constituted a search, the court 
in United Food found that the instrusion 
on employees' reasonable expectation of 
privacy was not only "minimal" under 
Skinner and Von Raab, but negligible 
for four reasons. Id. 
First, the employees in United Food 
received three distinct notices of testing: 
(1) that the physical would be during 
their "birthday" month; (2) within thirty 
days, they knew the week of the exami-
nation; and (3) within forty-eight hours, 
they knew the time ofthe physical. [d. at 
554, 565 A.2d at 67&77. Second, the 
disclosure of "private facts," including 
evidence of physical infirmities or latent 
diseases, was already part of the regular 
physical examination. [d. at 554-55, 565 
A.2d at 677. Therefore, no reasonable 
expectation of privacy existed with re-
gard to the disclosure of private facts. [d. 
Third, employees were required to com-
plete a medication form to determine 
whether a positive test could have re-
sulted from an employee's lawful use of 
drugs. [d. at 555, 565 A.2d at 677 (em-
phasis added). Although certain private 
medical facts might be disclosed on the 
medication form, the same facts would 
be the subject of inquiry during a routine 
physical examination. [d. Thus, comple-
tion of the medication form was not a 
significant invasion of privacy. Fourth, 
regular physical examinations were used 
to promote physical fitness and treat em-
ployees with drug abuse problems. [d. at 
555-56,565 A.2d at 677-78. 
The court of appeals next considered 
the governmental interests advanced by 
the drug tests. In Von Raab, the Supreme 
Court identified two govermental inter-
ests of a compelling nature which sup-
ported drug tests for certain Customs 
Service employees as "ensuring that 
front-line interdiction personnel are 
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